The ISCIP Analyst, Volume V, Issue 11 by Cavan, Susan et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy The ISCIP Analyst
2000-08-02
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume V, Issue
11
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11944
Boston University
 1 
THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 5, Number 11 (August 2, 2000) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Jittery moguls meet with Putin 
Weeks of tension between the Putin administration and Russia's business elite 
seem to have eased somewhat in the wake of a Kremlin sit-down between the 
president and 21 of the country's oligarchs. Notably absent from the meeting 
were Yel'tsin "Family" members Boris Berezovsky and Roman Abramovich, as 
well as the recently exonerated Media-Most Chief Vladimir Gusinsky. 
 
While the incarceration of Gusinsky brought fears of state control of the country's 
media to the forefront, the later moves against Norilsk Nickel and LUKoil really 
rattled the beneficiaries of Yel'tsin-era privatization. One of the most egregious 
examples of the insider-influenced sale of state property had been Vladimir 
Potanin's acquisition of shares in Norilsk Nickel. As Putin's law enforcement 
agencies conducted criminal investigations against Norilsk Nickel, the 
prosecutor's office sent a letter to Potanin recommending he pay $140 million to 
the state. Boris Nemtsov, leader of the Union of Right Forces, characterized this 
move as racketeering: "The essence of the letter is that Potanin should pay the 
money in exchange for closing all criminal cases against him." (INTERFAX, 1409 
GMT, 11 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0712, via World News Connection) 
 
Nemtsov argued that if Putin's police intended to change the rules of the game of 
privatization, potentially redistributing property from rebellious businessmen to 
compliant ones, then stock prices would be destabilized, and foreign investment 
would drop off. Nemtsov urged the president to hold a meeting with the business 
leaders to explain his policies. Chubais echoed the call for a meeting to clarify 
policy and explain the actions of "overzealous law enforcement officers." 
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(INTERFAX, 0933 GMT, 14 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0714, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The most dramatic move was Boris Berezovsky's resignation from the Duma and 
condemnation of Putin's attacks on industry. "This is a deliberate campaign 
aimed at destroying independent big business," Berezovsky claimed. (MOSCOW 
TIMES, 18 Jul 00; via Johnson's Russia List) He also compared the current 
regime to a military junta. Berezovsky's very public grousing and decision to give 
up his parliamentary immunity could, of course, have a range of motivations. He 
is too judicious to abandon immunity if he believed it soon would be of use to 
him.  
 
Eventually, Nemtsov succeeding in brokering a meeting, scheduled for Putin's 
return from the G-8 summit in Okinawa. Participants later seemed reassured that 
Putin would not seek the redistribution of property. Nemtsov seemed most 
confident, commenting "The president clearly and concisely said that there would 
be no review of the outcome of privatization." (REUTERS, 28 Jul 00; via 
Johnson's Russia List) 
 
Others appeared less certain. Potanin noted that while some of his concerns had 
been addressed, "It is not that I have lost my fear (of the authorities) after this 
meeting." 
 
The Kremlin statement, issued after the meeting, did concur with Nemtsov on 
privatization, but also stressed the need for changes in the oligarchs' use of state 
agencies and structures "to achieve their goals." (REUTERS, 29 Jul 00; via 
Johnson's Russia List) 
 
Other reports mentioned the need for businessmen to become regular tax-paying 
citizens, suggesting either that legitimate tax policy would be rigidly enforced, or 
that law enforcement agencies would be pursuing tax bills aggressively, even on 
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previously hidden accounts. The head of the Federal Tax Police Service, 
Vyacheslav Soltaganov, did recently request that the president grant his agency 
the right to "control financial flows into and out of Russia." (ITAR-TASS, 1037 
GMT, 12 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0712, via World News Connection) 
 
The importance of this meeting is brought into question, however, by the 
absence of the oligarchs thought closest to the Kremlin. While Berezovsky's 
absence could be seen as further protest against the administration, his recent 
comments suggest that he may have had his own reconciliation with Putin. While 
he still believes Putin has erred in his relations with the elites (and that, of 
course, includes the regional governors), he no longer believes Putin's actions 
represent an attempt to redistribute property. (INTERFAX, 29 Jul 00; via lexis-
nexis) Recent reports of Kremlin attempts to win state control of media outlets, 
including Berezovsky's shares of ORT, cast serious doubt on that conclusion 
however.  
 
Berezovsky further makes the point that if Luzhkov or Primakov had won the 
presidential election, they would have "easily been able to imprison the entire 
present Kremlin administration." In an appeal clearly meant to resonate with 
Putin, Berezovsky called for a "wise decision" of the sort made at the end of the 
Soviet era, "not to make public the KGB lists." While it is just the sort of argument 
likely to win over the president, it is, however, an intriguing comparison of spies 
and informers to oligarchs and reformers. 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL 
Council to mediate military row 
The president stepped into the increasingly public dispute between Chief of the 
General Staff Anatoli Kvashnin and Defense Minister Igor Sergeev over the 
status of the Strategic Missile Troops. He brought both officers into the Kremlin 
for a discussion of the problem, and handed the task of mediating between them 
to Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov. An upcoming council session will 
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deal with military reform and development through the year 2010. (INTERFAX, 
0901 GMT, 15 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0715, via World News Connection) 
 
MVD 
Terrorist attacks prevented? 
In an oddly terse report, the Anti-Organized Crime Department announced that 
officers of the MVD and FSB had prevented a "number of major acts of terrorism" 
across Russia on 19 July. (ITAR-TASS, 1009 GMT, 20 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0720, via World News Connection) According to the report, many saboteurs in 
several Russian cities were arrested simultaneously. Explosive devices and 
detonators were also seized. Further details are not being made public as more 
arrests are expected.  
 
FSB 
Nikitin pursued again? 
Aleksandr Nikitin, the retired naval officer acquitted of charges of treason in 
connection with his contribution to an environmentalist group's report on radiation 
leakage, may soon have to answer the charges all over again. The prosecutor 
general's office has asked the Supreme Court to suppress the acquittal. It is 
unclear whether further evidence has been found in the case, as most of the 
information in the charges was claimed to be classified. (INTERFAX, 0936 GMT, 
21 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0721, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
Pragmatically Yours? 
Western observers have hailed Russia's new foreign policy doctrine as a 
pragmatic statement of national interests -- untainted, for the most part, by 
ideology. Pragmatism, however, is a means to an end, not an end in itself. If 
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Russia is still pursuing aims contrary to the interests of the United States and the 
West, then it hardly matters whether that is done "pragmatically" or not.  
 
In flummoxing President Bill Clinton's half-hearted attempts to promote the 
American program for missile defense, Russian President Vladimir Putin has 
shown that Russia pragmatically can paint an inattentive White House into a 
corner. Missile defense, it seems, is dying a death of a thousand pragmatic cuts. 
When Russia so effectively thwarts a US foreign policy initiative, how it chooses 
to attain its goal matters less than the fact that it has won.  
 
Russia's new foreign policy concept, signed by President Putin on 28 June and 
published on 7 July, is not so pragmatic as to abandon dreams of Russian 
influence around the globe. In its preface, the doctrine lists as one of its goals: "to 
achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully 
consistent with the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power, as one 
of the most influential centres of the modern world, and which are necessary for 
the growth of its political, economic, intellectual and spiritual potential." 
(MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WEBSITE, 7 Jul 00; BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis)  
 
It ought not to be forgotten that such "pragmatic" means remain in service of a 
national ideology that demands international prestige and influence as an end in 
itself. Indeed, in opposing a missile defense system that would reduce the threat 
of Russia's warheads, the Kremlin has maneuvered Russia back onto the world 
stage. 
 
Goodbye NMD... Hello, Arms Control 
Arriving late at the Okinawa summit, tired and distracted from Middle East peace 
talks, Clinton hardly had the strength to rebut heavy criticism of American plans 
for national missile defense (NMD). The Kremlin had laid the groundwork for its 
case weeks in advance, and the president chose to concede the round.  
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Even before he left Russia, Putin had bolstered his case against American NMD 
by releasing some more details of the Russian alternative: Russia's "pan-
European, non-strategic antimissile defense system" could be built alongside a 
European program to assess threats, design early warning systems and jointly 
research missile technology. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 12 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0712, via World News Connection)  
 
On his way to Okinawa, President Putin used trips to China and North Korea to 
strengthen his brief further. In Beijing he picked up the endorsement of a major 
nuclear power not invited to the G-8 summit. (INTERFAX, 18 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0718, via World News Connection) In Pyongyang, on the other hand, he 
gathered assurances from President Kim Il Sung that North Korea posed no 
danger to the West, particularly if Western nations helped it develop rockets for 
satellite delivery. 
 
By the time of the summit, in other words, negotiations over NMD had reached 
an impasse. In hopes of derailing American plans by arguing in favor of the 
stability the 1972 ABM Treaty guaranteed, Russia proposed developing a 
workable, international system that is just as "illegal" as any American one. In the 
name of adhering closely to the ABM Treaty, the Americans remained far more 
cautious, and promoted -- however halfheartedly -- a system that probably would 
not meet its stated aims. Worse, despite its supposed fealty to ABM, the US 
system has been widely opposed.  
 
After bilateral meetings, Clinton and Putin signed a declaration that shifted the 
emphasis from defense back to arms control agreements. The joint declaration, a 
mere restatement of the thin points of agreement reached in Moscow in June, 
committed the White House and Kremlin to "making progress in further reduction 
of nuclear weapons arsenals, preservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty 
and counteraction to new challenges to international security." (ITAR-TASS, 
 7 
1350 GMT, 21 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0721, via World News Connection) 
Clinton also accepted documents outlining Putin's plan to reach START-III, which 
entailed continued adherence to the ABM Treaty and reduction of each sides' 
arsenals to 1,500 warheads. (INTERFAX, 1420 GMT, 21 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-0721, via World News Connection) 
 
Russia had already defined changes to the ABM Treaty as a threat to 
international security, and had promised to abandon arms control negotiations if 
it felt the treaty had been violated. By returning to the arms control course, the 
US administration effectively abandoned all attempts to counter Russian 
opposition to missile defense with a strong campaign of its own. Indeed, the 
president was so far off his game that he was even unwilling to object to Russia's 
support for North Korea's missile development, purportedly meant to allow it to 
launch satellites. (INTERFAX, 21 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0721, via World New 
Connection)  
 
Kinder, gentler? 
The international argument, in other words, had come full circle. Missile defense 
had been given new impetus in 1998, when North Korea launched a rocket over 
Japan, supposedly a test of satellite delivery but seen at the time as an overt 
threat to the West. Now that Clinton and Putin are back talking about arms 
control and even taking North Korea's plans for "satellite launches" seriously, the 
tough-minded aims of the Kremlin's "pragmatic" methods ought to be clear.  
 
In some sense it is "pragmatic" to negotiate rather than bluster, and to tangle 
one's opponent in a net of agreements rather than stare him down with knives 
drawn. The new, "pragmatic" Kremlin, however, has achieved its old aim. When 
Washington is coerced into agreeing that North Korea might have a legitimate 
need for powerful rockets, it is clear that the missile defense game is truly up. 
Does it really matter whether the United States lost this round to "pragmatic" 
Russia rather than a bellicose one? 
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Peace treaty at last? 
After a whirlwind Asian diplomatic tour in July, Russian President Putin will head 
back to the East in early September for his first official diplomatic visit to Japan 
since assuming the presidency. With only a month until the visit -- to be held in 
Tokyo from 3-5 September -- and only five months until the self-imposed 
deadline for completing a Russo-Japanese peace treaty arrives, all eyes will be 
focused on the summit's outcome. (AP, 1510 GMT, 23 Jul 00; via lexis-nexis) 
Until then, the question remains: Could Russia and Japan actually sign a peace 
treaty within the year?  
 
Russo-Japanese diplomatic efforts over the past few years suggest that peace 
treaty negotiations are usually heavy on rhetoric but lacking in substance. Since 
Yel'tsin and Hashimoto met in 1997 and set the year 2000 as a deadline for a 
peace treaty, efforts have been stymied by uncompromising attitudes on the 
status of the Kurile islands. The Japanese government continues to make 
conclusion of a peace treaty by 2000 conditional on the resolution of the Kurile 
islands territorial issue. This has been the Japanese stance since the 1993 
Tokyo Declaration, which stated that a peace treaty would be signed after the 
territorial issue was concluded, and the 1998 Moscow Declaration, which 
officially specified the year 2000 as the target date. (See The NIS Observed, 13 
Jan 99) Meanwhile, the Russian government has been unwilling to compromise 
on the Kuriles, refusing to relinquish the islands. Barring any significant 
compromise by the Russians on the issue, the upcoming summit has about as 
much chance of resolving the matter as any previous meeting.  
 
Since Putin's meetings with Mori and Hashimoto in the spring of 2000, the 
Russians have avoided addressing the topic with the Japanese, suggesting that 
the new president had yet to decide his negotiating stance. At the G-8 summit 
and the ASEAN Regional Forum held in late July, Russian and Japanese 
diplomats again avoided the topic altogether, indicating that neither side was 
prepared publicly to address the long-standing dispute. However, the upcoming 
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summit could mean that, despite previous bickering, the parties are prepared to 
negotiate the issues in a manner that would allow them to control the substance 
and outcome of the negotiations for the benefit of their domestic audiences.  
 
Possible economic gains constitute perhaps the only significant reason why 
Russia and Japan might put aside some of their differences and conclude a 
peace treaty. But even without such an agreement, Russia and Japan have 
gradually improved their economic relations over the past few years. As a case in 
point, the 1998 Moscow Declaration placed more emphasis on developing 
economic relations than resolving the territorial issue. The declaration included 
several economic cooperation agreements such as documents on joint 
cooperation in energy, tourism, telecommunications, the environment and 
investment, indicating that, while the Kuriles remain Russian, the two countries 
have not ruled out economic cooperation.  
 
Although it is impossible to predict the economic impact that a peace treaty could 
have on Japanese investment in the Russian Far East, it seems likely that it 
would only augment the current levels of Japanese economic investment. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Governors agree to leave Federation Council 
The Federation Council finally has given in, after weeks of fighting the Kremlin 
and the Duma. With a 119 to 18 margin of approval, the regional governors and 
heads of regional parliaments who sit in Federation Council at present have 
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agreed to leave in favor of permanent regional representatives whom they will 
select. 
 
Article 95, section 2 of the Constitution states that, "two deputies from each 
subject of the Federation shall be members of the Federation Council: one from 
the representative and one from the executive bodies of state authority." 
(www.russianet.ru). Since the manner in which this was to be accomplished was 
not specified, former President Boris Yel'tsin decided that each region's governor 
and the head of its parliament would sit in the Federation Council.  
 
President Putin does not like this arrangement. He claimed that the governors 
and heads of regional parliaments could not possibly do both jobs well, so he 
suggested a series of alternatives. The bill just ratified by the Federation Council 
is the product of this process.  
 
According to the bill, the Federation Council will no longer consist of governors 
and heads of regional parliaments; instead, the governors and parliaments will 
each select someone to represent them in the Federation Council, thereby 
keeping within the provisions of the Constitution and establishing an appointive 
cadre of Federation Council members more amenable to the president's wishes. 
 
The governors will be able to appoint whomever they wish, and each regional 
parliament will nominate a candidate, whom the governor then would appoint. 
Ideally the terms of office for these new members will coincide with the 
parliamentary session, or the governor's term in office, but provisions exist for the 
members' removal in the same way in which they were appointed. (INTERFAX, 
0847 GMT, 26 Jul 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Surely requiring that governors and heads of regional parliaments also sit in the 
Federation Council was a silly system and needed to be changed, however, this 
new arrangement is not much better. More important than concern over the 
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governors' busy schedules is Putin's desire to get a grip on all levers of power 
within the federation -- especially those levers as independent as the previous 
Federation Council system had been.  
 
According to Nikolai Fedorov, president of the republic of Chuvashia, the 
governors' approval of the law helps to create a climate unhealthy for democracy. 
"Today, the atmosphere in the society is such that the will of the emperor, the will 
of the president, is already the law. And the opinion of a Kremlin bureaucrat is 
more important than the constitutional stance of the Federation Council," he 
warned. (THE GAZETTE, 27 Jul 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Andrei Piontkovsky, director of the Independent Institute of Strategic Studies in 
Moscow, agrees: Such a "reform" removes the governors' responsibility for 
federal policy, he notes, giving such powers instead to persons who are not 
directly elected or answerable to voters. (THE GAZETTE, 27 Jul 00; via lexis-
nexis) 
 
REGIONS 
PACE slaps Russia with feather 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), ostensibly set up 
to monitor and defend human rights, seemingly is unable to evict Russia, whose 
brutal conduct in the Chechen war is widely acknowledged and who by PACE's 
own admission has violated the association's treaty commitments. Instead of 
standing by the lofty ideals with which it was constructed, PACE continues to 
make tiny squeaking noises which, not surprisingly, Russia is ignoring. (For an 
earlier look at the weak-handed policies of the Council of Europe, see The NIS 
Observed, 24 Apr 00) 
 
The most recent installation in the poor showing of the Parliamentary Assembly 
is tellingly titled, "Conflict in the Chechen Republic -- Follow-up to 
Recommendations 1444 (2000) and 1456 (2000) of the Parliamentary Assembly 
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Resolution 1221 (2000)." The new resolution -- using the same terms that have 
failed to impress the Kremlin heretofore -- states that, unless Moscow makes 
"substantial, accelerating and demonstrable progress" towards improving its 
conduct in Chechnya, Russia would face expulsion. It seems that Russia 
continues to remain in the Council of Europe not because its actions have 
changed, but, disconcertingly, because the Council of Europe's definitions of 
Russian human rights abuses seem to have shrunk. 
 
For instance, the Council of Europe's very own human rights commissioner, 
Alvaro Gil-Robles, stated last week that he wanted the Russian PACE delegation 
to return, after its members left voluntarily citing discrimination and Western 
bullying. Gil-Robles explained that "Russia is an important country for the Council 
of Europe." (EKHO MOSKVY, 1425 GMT, 24 Jul 00; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) Although his exact meaning is unclear, Russia's 
"right" to sit in the organization is apparently more important than the rights of 
individuals the organization has sworn to protect.  
 
More seriously, Gil-Robles also noted with approval, and apparently without 
further thought, that human rights conditions have improved in Chechnya. He 
cites as evidence the opening of a human rights office. "I find it very important 
that civilians have a chance to immediately report to bureau representatives 
about the violation of human rights they have experienced," Gil-Robles said. "I 
know the bureau has achieved certain results. Innocent people are freed from the 
captivity they found themselves in," he continued. (INTERFAX, 23 Jun 00; via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
The man is either naive or willfully ignoring the facts. That it should not occur to a 
commissioner of human rights that his perceived "improvement" was brought 
about by the bloody extermination of much of the Chechen population is not only 
dumbfounding, it borders on the complicitous. With such defenders of human 
rights, who needs violators? 
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Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
The Collective Security Treaty: at what price? 
"Terrorism" is described as the most pervasive threat to Russia and the CIS, 
according to the most recent meetings of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) 
members, but what will be the price for this "regional system of collective 
security"? Chechnya has given the world ample insight into the lengths to which 
Russia will go to protect its own soil from "terrorists," but it remains to be seen 
how far Russia will extend itself to "protect" the CIS Collective Security members' 
territory from that same threat.  
 
At their 25 July meeting of the chiefs of the General Staffs of the Collective 
Security Treaty in Moscow, the CST members addressed the practical measures 
needed to ensure the safety of their borders. (ITAR-TASS, 1321 GMT, 25 Jul 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0725, via World News Connection) The chiefs, charged with 
implementing the system of regional collective security to which the CST 
members agreed at their 25 May meeting in Minsk, did not publicize the outcome 
of their meeting, however, indicating that practical implementation of the system 
will be more difficult to achieve than their "anti-terrorism" rhetoric suggests. In 
essence, the states face practical challenges which will be extremely difficult to 
combat even if the member states were to give up a measure of independence -- 
by allowing Russian troops to occupy their soil -- to implement the system. (See 
The NIS Observed, 21 Jun 00) 
 
Beyond implementation rhetoric, the CST members first will have to admit the 
immensity of the project at hand. The problem facing the CST member states is 
pervasive and changeable, and will require large amounts of funding and 
cooperation to combat. CST member states already have undertaken operations 
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to curb the amount of drugs and arms that flow across their borders, but these 
efforts clearly are not sufficient. (See NIS Observed, 12 Jul 00) And although the 
CST members have singled out Afghanistan as the major conduit of drugs, arms 
and other illegal activity, the states must also come to terms with threats from 
within their own borders. 
 
Russia clearly wants to lead the charge against "terrorism" in the CIS, but 
Moscow's real intentions have yet to be seen. Furthermore, questions still remain 
about the economic and logistical feasibility of such an undertaking and the price 
that the CST members will have to pay for Russian "protection." 
(NEZAVISIMOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, 7 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0707, 
via World News Connection) Probably even more importantly, if the CST does 
begin to crack down on "terrorism," human rights questions certainly will creep 
into the picture, just as they have in Chechnya. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
Westward ho! 
Will Ukraine's future point eastward or westward? It is no secret, of course, that 
Ukraine's leaders would like the country to pursue a westward course. Given 
Ukraine's geographic, historic and economic position, however, this is not an 
easily available option. Consequently, the country has diligently followed its "safe 
zone of peace and stability" foreign policy, based on friendly relations with all its 
neighbors, and designed primarily to facilitate contact with NATO while not 
angering Russia. While practical, this policy nevertheless has condemned the 
country to remain in a type of political limbo, introducing often nebulous policies 
designed to keep all options open while not upsetting its neighbors, instead of 
moving forward. As the country has waited for a signal from Western countries 
and organizations that it will be welcomed, it has attempted to maintain an 
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unsteady balance between East and West, carefully avoiding committing itself to 
either course.  
 
In the last year, however, Ukraine's relations with the IMF soured and the 
European Union initially rejected its requests for attention. Most importantly, the 
country's energy situation worsened as its debts to Russia climbed. For a time, it 
looked as if Ukraine was in significant danger of lurching back to Russia, thus 
losing whatever balance it had achieved. Then came Poland.  
 
During a Russian-Polish presidential meeting on 10 July, Russian President 
Vladimir Putin proposed to Polish President Aleksandr Kwasnieski that a gas 
pipeline be constructed from Russia to Slovakia via Poland, in order to bypass 
Ukraine. According to Gazprom head Rem Vyakhirev, this would eliminate 
Ukraine's unsanctioned siphoning of gas from a Russian gas transit line running 
through the country. Ukraine does not dispute that its industries have stolen 10 
billion cubic meters of gas from that Russian gas line so far this year. Authorities 
insist, however, that they will somehow pay Russia for that gas. Moreover, they 
point out that building a new pipeline bypassing Ukraine would result in a 
significant loss of energy for the country, since Russia now pays Ukraine transit 
fees for the current pipeline in the form of gas.  
 
While President Kwasnieski's response to Russia's proposal was neutral at first, 
within days Poland had rejected it. "We do not want gas transit through Poland to 
harm Ukraine's interests. We cannot accept the routing (of the pipeline) 
according to Russia's proposal," Polish Economic Minister Janusz Steinhoff 
announced. (REUTERS, 21 Jul 00; via America On-line) Ukrainian Energy 
Minister Serhiy Yermilov responded jubilantly, "Today, the Polish side confirmed 
its resolute position on the strategic partnership with Ukraine. I am particularly 
happy because we clarified the issues that threatened Ukraine's economic 
interests. And I also say that the Ukrainian side will keep its obligations." 
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(POLISH RADIO 1, 1700 GMT, 21 Jul 00; FBIS-EEU-2000-0721, via World News 
Connection) 
 
With that, the partnership between Ukraine and Poland that had been growing 
steadily reached a new level. After centuries of often violent acrimony between 
their two peoples, Poland has now become Ukraine's solid link to the West. This 
link was further strengthened by a Polish proposal that could very well offer 
Ukraine a concrete way to break Russia's economic hold. Steinhoff suggested 
that the two countries review the possibility of Ukraine buying gas from a pipeline 
being constructed from Norway to Poland. That pipeline will bring 10 billion cubic 
meters of gas yearly to Poland beginning in 2004. Poland, however, will use only 
half that amount, and must find buyers for the rest. Ukraine was understandably 
interested in this proposal. 
 
This idea, combined with both the reworked Ukraine-Turkmenistan agreement 
that will provide the country with gas from that source at a significantly cheaper 
rate than from Russia and the movement toward completing two new Ukrainian 
nuclear reactors, could signal the beginning of the end of the Russian energy 
stranglehold on Ukraine. If this is in fact the case, Ukraine may finally be able to 
direct its foreign policy in the direction its leaders have wanted to go all along. 
For the first time since 1991, we may be able to talk about Ukraine moving 
steadily forward instead of balancing awkwardly between East and West. 
 
BELARUS 
No word on Zavadsky; many words from opposition 
Almost a month after the disappearance of ORT cameraman Dmitri Zavadsky, 
Belarusian authorities have made little progress on the case. Unfortunately, this 
comes as no surprise to anyone. Once a personal cameraman for President 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka, Zavadsky apparently has been under the watchful eye 
of the Belarusian Special Services since he left Lukashenka's employment to 
begin working at the Minsk bureau of ORT Russian television.  
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When Zavadsky's car was found deserted at the airport where he was to meet 
ORT correspondent Pavel Sheremet, there was little question as to what had 
happened. "In the context of the situation in the country," said Sheremet, "I have 
no doubts that my friend and colleague was taken by the Belarus security 
services under order from Lukashenko." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 9 Jul 00; 
via lexis-nexis) Sheremet speaks from experience; both he and Zavadsky were 
arrested in 1997 for "illegally crossing a border" while filming a report on lax 
Belarusian border controls. They were both convicted; Sheremet's full sentence 
was suspended, while Zavadsky served three months in prison. According to 
Sheremet, their arrests, the increasing number of opposition members who have 
gone missing, and now Zavadsky's disappearance, underscore the difficulty of 
opposing Lukashenka. "It is physically dangerous for politicians and journalists 
who upset the regime to work in Belarus," he said. 
 
Lukashenka, of course, vehemently denies this, suggesting that "Dima 
[Zavadsky] is a wonderful guy. He posed no threat to Belarusian special services, 
and Belarusian special services have never committed such acts and will never 
commit them." (BELARUSIAN RADIO FIRST PROGRAM, 1600 GMT, 21 Jul 00; 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) Later, no doubt to impress 
upon others the depths of his feelings on the issue, Lukashenka noted, "We will 
find Dimitri for certain, and I will wring the guilty by the neck. I will personally 
wring the neck of the one who kidnapped Zavadsky." (INTERFAX, 1347 GMT, 21 
Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0721, via World News Connection) These statements 
must have been comforting to Zavadsky's family. 
 
As Lukashenka was promising to wring someone's neck in the future, he 
continued to do so figuratively in the present -- to his political opposition. 
Lukashenka remains indignant at Western suggestions that the upcoming fall 
parliamentary election be held based on fair, transparent and understandable 
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rules. Staying true to Lukashenka form, these elections will be held his way or no 
way. His way, of course, means only his supporters can win. 
 
Understanding this perhaps better than any Western organization could hope to 
do, a coalition of opposition parties announced last week that it will boycott the 
election. "If we do not win the autumn campaign of boycott, if we do not explain 
to the people the real state of things, then we can lay a wreath at the grave of 
sovereignty and democracy," the United Civic Party's Anatoly Lebedko said. 
(REUTERS, 0940 GMT, 30 Jul 00; via America On-line) One can only hope that, 
for his eloquence, Lebedko is not condemned to join Zavadsky, wherever he may 
be. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: South Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Phantom mujahidin 
In its "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report released on 11 July, the US 
Department of State claimed that Azerbaijan "served as a logistic hub for 
international mujahidin with ties to terrorist groups, some of whom supported the 
Chechen insurgency in Russia." (www.state.gov)  
 
The statement is wildly inaccurate as well as counterproductive as far as US 
interests in the Caucasus are concerned. Although Russian spokesmen have 
asserted (without adducing any evidence) that mercenaries transit certain CIS 
countries including Azerbaijan, and that Chechen fighters undergo medical 
treatment in Azerbaijan, no one has alleged anything resembling the state 
department claim. However, when the US creates an opportunity, it would be a 
shame not to jump on it. So, suddenly 1,500 mujahadin poised on Azerbaijan's 
border with Dagestan were "discovered" by the Russian Security Service. (ITAR-
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TASS, 1843 GMT, 19 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0719, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The state department retracted its allegations on 20 July without explaining how 
the error had occurred or amending the text of the report on its web page. The 
department did now admit that Azerbaijan has taken all necessary measures to 
prevent terrorism and has cooperated with international anti-terrorism efforts. 
(INTERFAX, 20 Jul 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Usually, phantom mujahidin are the imaginings of Kremlin propagandists. The 
likes of Yastrzhembsky or Manilov make outrageous statements about vast 
international terrorist networks in the employ of religious zealots, depicting 
thousands of foreign fanatics making their way to Chechnya. With the Kremlin 
drumming up anti-Muslim sentiment at every opportunity perhaps it's not 
surprising, but still extremely unfortunate, that the US state department was 
caught up in these fantasies.  
 
Was independence worth the bother? 
It's not enough that Azerbaijan was unfairly stigmatized by the US Congress with 
Section 907 (barring aid to Azerbaijan, but not to Armenia) and erroneously 
accused by the state department of harboring "international mujahidin." Now the 
US Department of State and OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR) are meddling in the minutiae of the Azerbaijani electoral process, 
thus seriously exacerbating internal political tensions. 
 
On July 31 the opposition renewed its threaten of boycott which, if implemented, 
would invalidate the election and announced a mass raly for August 5. Last week 
the wrangling over the election law reached a fever a sharply worded statement 
from the US state department was issued on 24 July, calling on the Azerbaijani 
authorities to amend the electoral law in line with opposition demands. 
(www.usinfo.state.gov) 
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The reaction of the Azerbaijani government was restrained, with the head of the 
public and political department of the Presidential Executive Staff, Ali Hasanov, 
saying that "Azerbaijan respects the statement by the US State Department and 
regards it as an effort aimed at strengthening cooperation between the 
authorities and the opposition." The spokesman of the ruling New Azerbaijan 
Party, Siyavush Novruzov, put the matter more bluntly: "If Azerbaijan acts at any 
state's bidding (...) there would have been no point in leaving the USSR and 
gaining independence." (TURAN, 1440 GMT, 25 Jul 00; via BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
How did it come to this? 
The present standoff caps months of complex negotiations over minutiae 
concerning the composition of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) and the 
electoral law. On 5 July the Azerbaijani parliament passed an election law and a 
separate law on the CEC. The rules governing the CEC were accepted by all 
parties: the government, the opposition, and the ODIHR. The CEC would be 
comprised of 18 members with the governing party, independent deputies, and 
opposition parties appointing 6 representatives each. 
 
However, the electoral law did not obtain international endorsement and 
remained the object of dispute, with the opposition parties demanding several 
amendments. When parliament hesitated to amend the electoral law, the 
opposition began a boycott of the CEC. On 21 July after the CEC was unable to 
form a quorum for its first two meetings, the ODIHR issued a statement 
reiterating its criticism of the election law and calling on the opposition to 
participate in the CEC. On the same day, the Azerbaijani parliament altered the 
CEC legislation, lowering the requirements for a quorum and changing the 
composition of local electoral commissions. The opposition represerntatives did 
join the CEC on August 1, but continue to threaten a boycott of the elections 
unless the electoral law is ammended. 
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The changes to the CEC law prompted the US State Department to issue its 24 
July statement, saying "On July 21 Azerbaijan's parliament acted to change the 
law of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) in an apparent effort to eliminate 
the obligation that the government cooperate with the opposition...." How can the 
government cooperate with the opposition, if the opposition is engaged in a 
boycott? Unlike the ODIHR, the state department in its pronouncement laid all 
the blame on the government and did not encourage the opposition to return to 
the CEC.  
 
In effect, the state department insists that the government give in to the 
opposition, and issues a threat: "The final version of the law changed the way in 
which local precinct election commissions are selected, raising questions about 
whether a transparent and impartial vote count can be conducted in the 
November elections." If the elections are indeed called into question, 
Azerbaijan's entry into the Council of Europe may be delayed. Having been 
recently admitted to the Council of Europe by the PACE, Azerbaijan still needs 
the endorsement of the CE ministers to finalize its membership.  
 
It is not surprising to see political parties deeply embroiled in a fight over the 
Byzantine minutiae of the electoral law (see below). It is another matter entirely 
when the OSCE and the US state department enter the fray, by engaging in 
negotiations with the government on behalf of the opposition and by issuing 
scathing one-sided statements when the government holds to its own position. 
By taking sides in what is a purely domestic political issue, the OSCE and the 
state department are not acting as neutral third parties, but appear just as adept 
at rigging the elections and bullying the weak as any of the contending parties. If 
the principles of democracy and international oversight are sullied for the benefit 
of particular political actors, then those principles and institutions become 
degraded and are seen as the moral equivalent of the local bully.  
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In practice this interference has actually hurt the opposition which it was meant to 
help. The opposition parties, sometimes grouped into a coalition led by the 
Popular Front (AFP) and Musavat (and this time including the National 
Independence Party), have adopted the boycott strategy in previous elections. In 
the absence of international pressure, the boycott is always a losing strategy. If 
an opposition party boycotts an election, the government counts its blessings and 
ignores the demands. By the time the next election rolls around the boycotters 
are irrelevant. Non-participation is no way to accumulate political capital, build 
alliances, impress constituents, or train leaders. In the case of Azerbaijan, 
however, the US pressure has made the boycott a winning strategy for the 
opposition: The elections are not considered entirely democratic unless the 
government complies with opposition demands and persuades opposition parties 
to participate. As a result, the opposition remains inexperienced, bellicose, and 
divided.  
 
What is so wrong with the electoral law? 
The Azerbaijani election law is being written three months before the 
parliamentary elections. This process is so incredibly contentious because at this 
point it is possible to make reasonably accurate predictions about which party 
stands to benefit from each set of circumstances. The Azerbaijani government 
and the opposition are trying to bring about the adoption of those provisions that 
would give them the biggest advantages come election day, 5 November.  
 
The OSCE has criticized the "serious deficiencies" in the electoral law, pointing in 
particular to the "retroactive character of the provision requiring political parties to 
be registered 6 months in advance of the day elections are announced," but has 
not publicly identified the other concerns under discussion with the government. 
(ODIHR PRESS RELEASE, 7 Jul 00) The concern about retroactive legislation 
seems valid but its impact on the proceedings would be rather limited since it 
would disqualify only one opposition party (The Azerbaijan Democratic Party).  
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It's not clear whether the OSCE supports all of the oppositions demands, but it 
has not distanced itself from any of them. As we shall see, most of the 
amendments proposed by the opposition are grounded not in general democratic 
principles but in the particular political circumstances of the moment. (This list of 
opposition demands appeared in the AZERBAIJAN BULLETIN, 13 Jul 00.) 
 
1) The opposition would like to enlarge the number of members of parliament 
chosen on the basis of party lists from 25 to 50, at the expense of those elected 
in single-member constituencies. 
 
Is it possible to reason from general democratic principles that 50 seats is 
preferable to another number? In general, it may be that party hierarchies are 
more firmly in control when they pick candidates in a preferential order on a list 
than when individual candidates are chosen directly by the constituents in single-
member constituencies. Are political systems characterized by strong parties 
inherently more democratic? Political philosophers have been debating this issue 
for decades: There is no definitive consensus and won't be any time soon. In 
practice, we regard Norway (high degree of party discipline) and the United 
States (very low degree of party discipline) to be equally democratic.  
 
In the particular political landscape of present day Azerbaijan, increasing the 
number of seats distributed according to party lists would benefit the opposition. 
At present the various opposition parties have been unable to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable list of 25 top personalities. The Musavat and the Popular Front have 
determined separately the composition of their respective slates. The AFP youth 
congress in particular was marred by violence when the supporters of the two top 
rival leaders, Abulfaz Elchibey and Ali Kerimov actually came to blows. (RFE/RL 
CAUCASUS REPORT, 27 Jul 00) In fact, the chairman, Elchibey, who was 
president until 1993, has been in Turkey, ostensibly for medical attention, for the 
last several weeks. He affirmed his intention to participate in the elections after 
his prolonged absence and his previous boycott of elections spawned rumors 
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that he will again fail to participate. (AZERBAIJAN DEMOCRACY MONITOR, Jul 
00) If the electoral law is not amended, the main opposition parties seem likely to 
field separate lists of 25 candidates each, thus splitting their vote. If the number 
is raised to 50, they stand a better chance of merging their separate lists into one 
slate and running as a coalition. Moreover, the opposition, which relies heavily on 
the urban intelligentsia, probably lacks suitable candidates for many outlying rural 
constituencies, so it would perform better if fewer seats were tied to particular 
locales. 
 
2) The opposition would like to allow each voter to endorse more than one 
candidate at the registration stage. This amendment is not necessarily more 
democratic. Actually, if adopted, it may render the electoral system less inclusive 
and representative. By allowing each voter to endorse more than one candidate, 
the amendment invites the politically very active members of society (a relatively 
small portion of the electorate) to play a disproportionately large role in the 
nomination process. Again, in practice, there are democracies which allow this 
and others which do not. In Azerbaijan's particular political environment, 
characterized by a profusion of opposition parties, it may be more difficult for 
opposition candidates to obtain enough signatures without such duplication. 
 
3) The opposition would alter the provisions governing the creation of election 
committees at the district level. The opposition claims that the government is 
over-represented, but does not say by how much. Presumably, electoral 
commissions at all levels should follow the same principles as the CEC. On this 
point, the opposition may has a legitimate case concerning the danger of election 
fraud, the need for fair and transparent procedures in registering voters and in 
counting votes at the local and district level. In this instance, international 
institutions may have a legitimate role in providing neutral observers to monitor 
all stages of balloting and vote counting. 
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These highly technical nuances hardly warrant international attention and 
certainly don't deserved the kind of scathing criticism emanating from the state 
department. How does it serve US interests to aggravate the internal political 
battles in Azerbaijan? What does the US gain if the opposition does boycott? Or 
if the election is postponed? Regardless of the final shape of the electoral law, or 
even the outcome of the elections, all this wrangling only weakens a friendly 
country that is trying to stand up to Russian bullying in the region. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Nicholas Burk 
 
AZERBAIJAN 
Phantom mujahidin 
In its "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report released on 11 July, the US 
Department of State claimed that Azerbaijan "served as a logistic hub for 
international mujahidin with ties to terrorist groups, some of whom supported the 
Chechen insurgency in Russia." (www.state.gov)  
 
The statement is wildly inaccurate as well as counterproductive as far as US 
interests in the Caucasus are concerned. Although Russian spokesmen have 
asserted (without adducing any evidence) that mercenaries transit certain CIS 
countries including Azerbaijan, and that Chechen fighters undergo medical 
treatment in Azerbaijan, no one has alleged anything resembling the state 
department claim. However, when the US creates an opportunity, it would be a 
shame not to jump on it. So, suddenly 1,500 mujahadin poised on Azerbaijan's 
border with Dagestan were "discovered" by the Russian Security Service. (ITAR-
TASS, 1843 GMT, 19 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0719, via World News 
Connection) 
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The state department retracted its allegations on 20 July without explaining how 
the error had occurred or amending the text of the report on its web page. The 
department did now admit that Azerbaijan has taken all necessary measures to 
prevent terrorism and has cooperated with international anti-terrorism efforts. 
(INTERFAX, 20 Jul 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Usually, phantom mujahidin are the imaginings of Kremlin propagandists. The 
likes of Yastrzhembsky or Manilov make outrageous statements about vast 
international terrorist networks in the employ of religious zealots, depicting 
thousands of foreign fanatics making their way to Chechnya. With the Kremlin 
drumming up anti-Muslim sentiment at every opportunity perhaps it's not 
surprising, but still extremely unfortunate, that the US state department was 
caught up in these fantasies.  
 
Was independence worth the bother? 
It's not enough that Azerbaijan was unfairly stigmatized by the US Congress with 
Section 907 (barring aid to Azerbaijan, but not to Armenia) and erroneously 
accused by the state department of harboring "international mujahidin." Now the 
US Department of State and OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights (ODIHR) are meddling in the minutiae of the Azerbaijani electoral process, 
thus seriously exacerbating internal political tensions. 
 
On July 31 the opposition renewed its threaten of boycott which, if implemented, 
would invalidate the election and announced a mass raly for August 5. Last week 
the wrangling over the election law reached a fever a sharply worded statement 
from the US state department was issued on 24 July, calling on the Azerbaijani 
authorities to amend the electoral law in line with opposition demands. 
(www.usinfo.state.gov) 
 
The reaction of the Azerbaijani government was restrained, with the head of the 
public and political department of the Presidential Executive Staff, Ali Hasanov, 
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saying that "Azerbaijan respects the statement by the US State Department and 
regards it as an effort aimed at strengthening cooperation between the 
authorities and the opposition." The spokesman of the ruling New Azerbaijan 
Party, Siyavush Novruzov, put the matter more bluntly: "If Azerbaijan acts at any 
state's bidding (...) there would have been no point in leaving the USSR and 
gaining independence." (TURAN, 1440 GMT, 25 Jul 00; via BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
How did it come to this? 
The present standoff caps months of complex negotiations over minutiae 
concerning the composition of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) and the 
electoral law. On 5 July the Azerbaijani parliament passed an election law and a 
separate law on the CEC. The rules governing the CEC were accepted by all 
parties: the government, the opposition, and the ODIHR. The CEC would be 
comprised of 18 members with the governing party, independent deputies, and 
opposition parties appointing 6 representatives each. 
 
However, the electoral law did not obtain international endorsement and 
remained the object of dispute, with the opposition parties demanding several 
amendments. When parliament hesitated to amend the electoral law, the 
opposition began a boycott of the CEC. On 21 July after the CEC was unable to 
form a quorum for its first two meetings, the ODIHR issued a statement 
reiterating its criticism of the election law and calling on the opposition to 
participate in the CEC. On the same day, the Azerbaijani parliament altered the 
CEC legislation, lowering the requirements for a quorum and changing the 
composition of local electoral commissions. The opposition represerntatives did 
join the CEC on August 1, but continue to threaten a boycott of the elections 
unless the electoral law is ammended. 
 
The changes to the CEC law prompted the US State Department to issue its 24 
July statement, saying "On July 21 Azerbaijan's parliament acted to change the 
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law of the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) in an apparent effort to eliminate 
the obligation that the government cooperate with the opposition...." How can the 
government cooperate with the opposition, if the opposition is engaged in a 
boycott? Unlike the ODIHR, the state department in its pronouncement laid all 
the blame on the government and did not encourage the opposition to return to 
the CEC.  
 
In effect, the state department insists that the government give in to the 
opposition, and issues a threat: "The final version of the law changed the way in 
which local precinct election commissions are selected, raising questions about 
whether a transparent and impartial vote count can be conducted in the 
November elections." If the elections are indeed called into question, 
Azerbaijan's entry into the Council of Europe may be delayed. Having been 
recently admitted to the Council of Europe by the PACE, Azerbaijan still needs 
the endorsement of the CE ministers to finalize its membership.  
 
It is not surprising to see political parties deeply embroiled in a fight over the 
Byzantine minutiae of the electoral law (see below). It is another matter entirely 
when the OSCE and the US state department enter the fray, by engaging in 
negotiations with the government on behalf of the opposition and by issuing 
scathing one-sided statements when the government holds to its own position. 
By taking sides in what is a purely domestic political issue, the OSCE and the 
state department are not acting as neutral third parties, but appear just as adept 
at rigging the elections and bullying the weak as any of the contending parties. If 
the principles of democracy and international oversight are sullied for the benefit 
of particular political actors, then those principles and institutions become 
degraded and are seen as the moral equivalent of the local bully.  
 
In practice this interference has actually hurt the opposition which it was meant to 
help. The opposition parties, sometimes grouped into a coalition led by the 
Popular Front (AFP) and Musavat (and this time including the National 
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Independence Party), have adopted the boycott strategy in previous elections. In 
the absence of international pressure, the boycott is always a losing strategy. If 
an opposition party boycotts an election, the government counts its blessings and 
ignores the demands. By the time the next election rolls around the boycotters 
are irrelevant. Non-participation is no way to accumulate political capital, build 
alliances, impress constituents, or train leaders. In the case of Azerbaijan, 
however, the US pressure has made the boycott a winning strategy for the 
opposition: The elections are not considered entirely democratic unless the 
government complies with opposition demands and persuades opposition parties 
to participate. As a result, the opposition remains inexperienced, bellicose, and 
divided.  
 
What is so wrong with the electoral law? 
The Azerbaijani election law is being written three months before the 
parliamentary elections. This process is so incredibly contentious because at this 
point it is possible to make reasonably accurate predictions about which party 
stands to benefit from each set of circumstances. The Azerbaijani government 
and the opposition are trying to bring about the adoption of those provisions that 
would give them the biggest advantages come election day, 5 November.  
 
The OSCE has criticized the "serious deficiencies" in the electoral law, pointing in 
particular to the "retroactive character of the provision requiring political parties to 
be registered 6 months in advance of the day elections are announced," but has 
not publicly identified the other concerns under discussion with the government. 
(ODIHR PRESS RELEASE, 7 Jul 00) The concern about retroactive legislation 
seems valid but its impact on the proceedings would be rather limited since it 
would disqualify only one opposition party (The Azerbaijan Democratic Party).  
 
It's not clear whether the OSCE supports all of the oppositions demands, but it 
has not distanced itself from any of them. As we shall see, most of the 
amendments proposed by the opposition are grounded not in general democratic 
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principles but in the particular political circumstances of the moment. (This list of 
opposition demands appeared in the AZERBAIJAN BULLETIN, 13 Jul 00.) 
 
1) The opposition would like to enlarge the number of members of parliament 
chosen on the basis of party lists from 25 to 50, at the expense of those elected 
in single-member constituencies. 
 
Is it possible to reason from general democratic principles that 50 seats is 
preferable to another number? In general, it may be that party hierarchies are 
more firmly in control when they pick candidates in a preferential order on a list 
than when individual candidates are chosen directly by the constituents in single-
member constituencies. Are political systems characterized by strong parties 
inherently more democratic? Political philosophers have been debating this issue 
for decades: There is no definitive consensus and won't be any time soon. In 
practice, we regard Norway (high degree of party discipline) and the United 
States (very low degree of party discipline) to be equally democratic.  
 
In the particular political landscape of present day Azerbaijan, increasing the 
number of seats distributed according to party lists would benefit the opposition. 
At present the various opposition parties have been unable to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable list of 25 top personalities. The Musavat and the Popular Front have 
determined separately the composition of their respective slates. The AFP youth 
congress in particular was marred by violence when the supporters of the two top 
rival leaders, Abulfaz Elchibey and Ali Kerimov actually came to blows. (RFE/RL 
CAUCASUS REPORT, 27 Jul 00) In fact, the chairman, Elchibey, who was 
president until 1993, has been in Turkey, ostensibly for medical attention, for the 
last several weeks. He affirmed his intention to participate in the elections after 
his prolonged absence and his previous boycott of elections spawned rumors 
that he will again fail to participate. (AZERBAIJAN DEMOCRACY MONITOR, Jul 
00) If the electoral law is not amended, the main opposition parties seem likely to 
field separate lists of 25 candidates each, thus splitting their vote. If the number 
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is raised to 50, they stand a better chance of merging their separate lists into one 
slate and running as a coalition. Moreover, the opposition, which relies heavily on 
the urban intelligentsia, probably lacks suitable candidates for many outlying rural 
constituencies, so it would perform better if fewer seats were tied to particular 
locales. 
 
2) The opposition would like to allow each voter to endorse more than one 
candidate at the registration stage. This amendment is not necessarily more 
democratic. Actually, if adopted, it may render the electoral system less inclusive 
and representative. By allowing each voter to endorse more than one candidate, 
the amendment invites the politically very active members of society (a relatively 
small portion of the electorate) to play a disproportionately large role in the 
nomination process. Again, in practice, there are democracies which allow this 
and others which do not. In Azerbaijan's particular political environment, 
characterized by a profusion of opposition parties, it may be more difficult for 
opposition candidates to obtain enough signatures without such duplication. 
 
3) The opposition would alter the provisions governing the creation of election 
committees at the district level. The opposition claims that the government is 
over-represented, but does not say by how much. Presumably, electoral 
commissions at all levels should follow the same principles as the CEC. On this 
point, the opposition may has a legitimate case concerning the danger of election 
fraud, the need for fair and transparent procedures in registering voters and in 
counting votes at the local and district level. In this instance, international 
institutions may have a legitimate role in providing neutral observers to monitor 
all stages of balloting and vote counting. 
 
These highly technical nuances hardly warrant international attention and 
certainly don't deserved the kind of scathing criticism emanating from the state 
department. How does it serve US interests to aggravate the internal political 
battles in Azerbaijan? What does the US gain if the opposition does boycott? Or 
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if the election is postponed? Regardless of the final shape of the electoral law, or 
even the outcome of the elections, all this wrangling only weakens a friendly 
country that is trying to stand up to Russian bullying in the region. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Nicholas Burk 
 
After Shanghai-5: Waiting for the Wahhabis 
One year ago, a band of Islamist rebels calling itself the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) invaded the Kyrgyz southern province of Batken. The intention 
was to invade Uzbekistan and overthrow the secular regime of Islam Karimov, 
who has declared "Islamist terror" to be the number one threat facing the state. 
Since then, members of the Shanghai-5 essentially have created a security 
system in Central Asia -- with Moscow taking the lead, and Central Asia and 
Beijing playing the role of the supporting cast. With Uzbekistan increasingly 
prepared to participate in the forum, the Shanghai-5 pits Central Asia (minus 
Turkmenistan), Russia, and China against...Wahhabi terrorism. The latter 
supposedly comprises the Taliban, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, militant 
Uighurs, Chechens, Osama bin Laden, Khattab, and other shadowy groups and 
persons with their eyes on the Fergana Valley. In May, Russia threatened to 
attack targets in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Now, in August, one more spark 
could make the Shanghai-5 the dominant security system in Central Asia for the 
foreseeable future.  
 
IMU: the most likely spark 
The trigger for a major operation in Central Asia against Islamist groups could 
come from a number of sources. Most likely to precipitate action by the 
Shanghai-5 is another incursion by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In early 
July, a border post on the Kyrgyz-Tajik border came under attack from what 
Kyrgyz military officials believe to have been the IMU, preparing to invade Uzbek 
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territory via Batken province one year after its first attempt. (AFP, 7 Jul 00; via 
lexis-nexis) 
 
Four days later, Kyrgyz authorities detained three more Uzbeks they claimed 
were scouting Kyrgyz territory on behalf of IMU leader Juma Namangani. 
(INTERFAX, 11 Jul 00; via lexis-nexis) The IMU is an organization consisting of 
perhaps 2,000 men, although the UN secretary-general's representative, Ivo 
Petrov, also warns that some of the 6,000 demobilized Tajik fighters may be 
prime candidates to join such a movement. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 18 Jul 00; FBIS-NES-00-0719, via World News 
Connection)  
 
Finding employment for these bedraggled fighters is paramount, according to 
Petrov. Islam Karimov's crackdown on moderate Islamic groups in his own 
country is no help, either. In fact, Karimov's harsh suppression of Islamic 
expression has helped to make the IMU a more dangerous organization by 
shutting out all other forms of resistance to his regime. However, the IMU may 
ultimately be less concerned with forming an Islamic state in Uzbekistan than in 
stirring up enough instability to secure its firm hold on Central Asian drug trading 
routes. (JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW, 1 Jul 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Friends of the IMU: Arab-Afghans, militant Kyrgyz, and Islamist Uighurs 
The IMU appears to have questionable "sister organizations" which have been 
active in the past month. For example, Uzbek security forces allegedly arrested 
an assistant of bin Laden sidekick and Chechnya mastermind Khattab. The man 
under question, Shukhrat Balikov, reportedly made some startling confessions. 
Khattab's Afghan camps consist of 1,500 fighters calling themselves "Warriors of 
Islam," poised to overthrow the Uzbek state. Is Warriors of Islam just another 
name for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan? Apparently not: Balikov was 
attempting to find IMU leader Tahir Yoldashev to acquire money from him to 
subsidize the Chechen war. (ITAR-TASS, 15 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0715, via 
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World News Connection) Khattab has denied even knowing Balikov, and added 
that he was puzzled at the explanation offered by Uzbek and Russian authorities, 
since such a crossing into Uzbekistan would be "foolish" considering there are 
easier ways to travel through the region. (BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD 
BROADCASTS, 18 Jul 00; via lexis-nexis)  
 
Also, some 300 Kyrgyz "future extremists and wahhabites" are reportedly training 
in Pakistani-run camps in Kyrgyz territory, according to the Kyrgyz military 
establishment. (INTERFAX, 17 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0714, via World News 
Connection) It is not clear if this group is affiliated with either bin Laden or the 
IMU. If Pakistan's Internal Security Services (ISI) are in fact responsible for these 
camps, this would represent an impressive reach -- beyond Afghanistan and into 
the sovereign territory of a Central Asian state.  
 
Moreover, one can never discount the Uighurs. Authorities in Bishkek clamped 
down on a new rebel group this month consisting of 10 Uzbek, Turkish, Kyrgyz, 
and Chinese citizens. The goal of these Islamist Uighurs, according to Kyrgyz 
Interior Minister Amurbek Kutuev, was to topple the authorities of the Shanghai-
5. (INTERFAX, 10 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0710, via World News Connection) 
For a movement that has failed to dislodge Xinjiang from China, setting sights on 
Russia, China, and Central Asia would be clearly preposterous. 
 
The Taliban: always a dependable enemy 
Russia's threats to bomb the Taliban can be interpreted as an ever-present "last 
resort" option. (FOREIGN REPORT, 6 Jul 00; via lexis-nexis) Even if the IMU 
threat or its equivalents fizzle, the Taliban is always willing to provide the 
agitation which may lead to military action. In the past two months, rumors have 
circulated that the Taliban occasionally shells targets in Uzbek territory, or that 
Uzbek planes fly sorties over Taliban-territory. If an important Uzbek location 
were attacked by Taliban artillery, or an Uzbek fighter-bomber were to be shot 
down by a Stinger missile, the repercussions could be massive -- especially now 
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that Russia and Uzbekistan are beginning to conduct joint military operations, 
starting with air defense. (INTERFAX, 11 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0711, via 
World News Connection)  
 
The Taliban has also made important gains on the ground. Its armed forces have 
captured strategic Nahreen district, a supply line linking Tajikistan to a key 
Afghan Northern Alliance base in the Panjshir Valley. (AFP, 30 Jul 00; via lexis-
nexis) Moreover, as if to play on the fears of the Shanghai-5, the Taliban 
threatened to respond "tit-for-tat" to any collective action by the organization. 
(ITAR-TASS, 26 Jul 00; via lexis-nexis) Yet how can the Taliban regime respond 
"tit-for-tat" to any action of these countries (including Uzbekistan)? An infantry 
assault on Central Asian territory is far-fetched. Summoning the help of the Arab-
Afghans, IMU, and other Central Asian terrorist groups in a crusade against the 
Shanghai-5 would require a level of cooperation and integration between these 
groups that probably does not exist. Most likely, the Taliban could shell Central 
Asian villages close to the Afghanistan border or attempt to shoot down intruding 
fighters. The biggest weapon in the Taliban arsenal that would stimulate conflict, 
however, may be rhetoric. 
 
An emerging South Asian angle? 
Further complicating this situation is the possibility that tensions between India 
and Pakistan could open a Central Asian arena between the two nations. 
Pakistan's Internal Security Services have long been viewed as a supporter of 
the Taliban and related guerrilla activities. Indeed, the Taliban emerged from the 
refugee camps of Pashawar. China has long been concerned over Pakistani 
training of militant Uighurs. And, as pointed out above, Kyrgyzstan has claimed 
that rebel camps in its territory are Pakistani-run. 
 
India also remains wary of the influence of Pakistan's ISI, especially in the 
conflict over Kashmir. In what could be a dramatic addition to the forum, India 
has indicated an interest in joining the Shanghai-5, and President Putin affirmed 
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that he would be open to adding more members to the club. (THE HINDU, 6 Jul 
00; via lexis-nexis) India already is fearful that, because of ISI influence in Nepal, 
that country is becoming a haven for ISI-backed activities. (INDIA TODAY, 3 Jul 
00; via lexis-nexis) A role for India in the Shanghai process may be applauded by 
Russia, China, and the Central Asian states. After all, who else is better suited to 
counter Pakistani elements in Wahhabism? If a collective military action by the 
Shanghai-5 solidifies the organization as a security entity, India's continuing 
interest in the pact should be monitored. 
 
What is to come?  
There seems to be little doubt that Pakistan's ISI bolsters rebel Islamic 
movements in the region. Certainly, Osama bin Laden's Arab-Afghans are a 
rugged fighting force, and the IMU managed to hold ground in Kyrgyz territory for 
nearly two months in 1999. Undoubtedly, there is also a "mix-and-match" 
element to these Islamist movements: Some Uighurs could well be training in 
Afghanistan, on their way to Chechnya. At the same time, it cannot be forgotten 
that last spring Juma Namangani was safely escorted to Taliban territory with 
Russia's help. Shukhrat Balikov's story is questionable -- perhaps even his 
identity. And it is hard to imagine that the phrase "Shanghai-5" is widespread in 
the Islamist Uighurian lexicon.  
 
An invasion by the IMU into southern Kyrgyzstan is likely to elicit collective action 
within Central Asia, possibly accompanied by airstrikes against Taliban territory. 
Internal operations could also attempt to weed out other groups in the Central 
Asian republics. It is possible that the borders of some republics would be altered 
de facto by these operations -- Uzbekistan may be inclined to hang on to Tajik or 
Kyrgyz territory in this event. If conflict does not come from within Central Asia, 
the Taliban always is a prime candidate for preemptive strikes. When the dust 
clears, the world may be introduced to a collectively acting Shanghai-5 -- with 
India possibly entering the fold. 
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Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Is NATO's door half-open, or half-closed? 
The alliance's much-touted "open door" policy, and the hopes of aspirant states, 
have taken a few knocks in the past couple of months, and some confusion on 
where the applicant states stand is quite comprehensible. Some signals have 
been less than encouraging, but the "open door" remains... ajar. 
 
Representatives of nine countries -- Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovakia, Albania, Macedonia and Slovenia -- signed an appeal urging 
NATO to extend invitations to join the alliance at the next summit in 2002. The 
Vilnius Declaration reaffirmed the path each country was taking toward 
acceptance into the alliance, and recognized the importance of accession to both 
NATO and the European Union (EU), "the two pillars of the Euro-Atlantic 
community." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 19 May 00) 
 
While the West by and large reacted favorably to the statement, NATO 
Secretary-General George Robertson responded to the Vilnius Declaration with 
appreciation and a warning. The declaration, Robertson said, "is a striking 
example of how NATO's commitment to keeping the door open to new members 
is fostering cooperation and growing commitment to NATO's own vision of a 
Euro-Atlantic area based on democracy, peace, prosperity and fundamental 
rights." However, he also made sure to note the alliance's need to "get the 
NATO-Russia relationship back on track." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1000 GMT, 19 May 00) Given Russia's frequently voiced opposition to 
the inclusion of the Baltic states in the alliance, it is unclear which of NATO's two 
apparently contradictory goals will prevail. Unfortunately, it appears as though 
appeasing Russia's demands has begun to supersede offering security to the 
Baltic states. 
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Putin's reiteration in June of a "red line" for NATO enlargement drew a spirited 
attack from Lithuania. Such attempts to keep the Baltic states out of NATO, the 
statement reads, remind the world how "such a line was drawn by Molotov and 
Ribbentrop and what had happened as a consequence of this." (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 20 Jun 00) The German chancellor, who 
visited the Baltic states in June, did not rise to the bait. Small wonder. 
 
During his trip to Riga, Gerhard Schroeder refused to make a clear statement of 
Germany's stand on the Vilnius Declaration in regards to NATO membership, 
although he reiterated his country's support for Baltic accession to the EU. This is 
hardly surprising, since German signals on NATO aspirants have been quite 
mixed of late. Walter Kolbow, the state secretary of the German Ministry of 
Defense, caused an uproar when he stated in Tallinn that Russian consent would 
be needed before the next round of NATO enlargement. "We need to make it 
clear to Russia that NATO is a guarantor of collective security and has no 
aggressive plans towards any country," he said. "The relations between NATO 
and Russia were disrupted after the Kosovo conflict but now we again sit at the 
same table," he added, "Russia's participation in European security processes is 
important." (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 19 Jun 00) 
Germany's defense ministry hastily denied that Russia would have a veto in 
NATO affairs. Yet this situation is quickly becoming a matter of semantics. 
 
The biggest knock came during a visit to London by Vytautas Landsbergis, 
speaker of the Lithuanian parliament. Landsbergis learned from Bruce George, 
chairman of the British House of Commons defence committee, that, despite 
George's own wholehearted support, doubts were being raised among alliance 
members about the prudence of an invitation to the Baltics to join NATO. The 
reasons behind the doubts cited, however, are patently spurious: 1) That the 
newest members to the alliance have yet to prove that this accession was 
successful and productive; 2) that the Kosovo crisis proved how difficult gaining 
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consensus of an already large alliance could be; 3) and that Poland, because of 
its size, was seen as a useful ally by the West, as opposed to Lithuania, which is 
significantly smaller and had the added disadvantage of once having been part of 
the Soviet Union. (BNS, 1606 GMT, 13 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0713) It seems 
clear that such objections have been drummed up to provide a way for the West 
to save face and bow to Russia's continued opposition, while not appearing to 
give a non-member direct veto power over NATO decisions.  
 
While Western officials go in search of a collective backbone, one official from a 
non-NATO member was willing to be more direct. A Finnish member of the 
European Parliament, Ilkka Suominen, was quoted as saying that Baltic 
admittance to NATO "would not be good" for Finland, due to the possible security 
ramifications of Russia's opposition. (BNS, 1807 GMT, 7 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0708, via World News Connection) 
 
It is noteworthy that, as the West hurries to reassure the world that Russia poses 
no danger, countries immediately adjacent have quite a different perception. 
 
Oh, the humanity! 
Having seen how efficacious the continued repetition of fact-deprived statements 
can be, Russia continued to rail against perceived abuses of human rights in the 
Baltic states, particularly in Latvia. Indeed, in mid-July Russian government 
sources reported that Latvian authorities continue "flagrant human rights 
violations against some of its population" and enforced "assimilation of non-
Latvian ethnic groups." (INTERFAX, 1315 GMT, 14 Jul 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
0714, via World News Connection) However, lately few countries have been 
willing to allow such accusations to remain unchallenged. At the end of May, a 
statement from Portugal, the presiding country of the EU, issued during the 
OSCE permanent council meeting in Vienna rejected Russia's claims of alleged 
human rights violations, and rebuked Moscow for its behavior. "During the last 
few months Russia, using very sharp statements, has expressed reproaches to 
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Latvia and Estonia. Such policy is not only unproductive but is simply 
unacceptable for modern Europe," the statement reads. (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1600 GMT, 25 May 00) The Lithuanian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs subsequently announced that it was adding its voice to the EU 
appeal urging Russia to end its attacks against Latvia. 
 
US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott also recently characterized Russian 
accusations about the Baltic countries as groundless. Talbott was reacting 
negatively to Russian claims that Latvia's recent spate of prosecutions against 
war criminals was an indication of neofascism. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1300 GMT, 7 Jun 00)  
 
Latvia wasn't the only country taking hits from Moscow, however. Russian 
Deputy Prime Minister Valentina Matvienko linked Russo-Estonian relations to 
the manner in which Russians living in Estonia perceive their situation. "Lack of 
regulation of their status, restrictions to their rights as an ethnic minority serve as 
the main obstacle today to a stable and progressive development of the 
Estonian-Russian relations," she said. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1600 GMT, 3 Jul 00) While Matvienko clearly was speaking with an 
assumption of rights abuse, weeks earlier the German chancellor had viewed 
Estonia's domestic situation in a different light altogether, and praised "Estonia's 
readiness to conciliation and co-existence" with regard to its ethnic Russian 
minority. Schroeder characterized this willingness as humanistic for a country 
whose culture and language have been endangered for centuries. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1300 GMT, 6 Jun 00) 
 
Another bone of contention between the three Baltic states and Russia is 
Moscow's refusal to acknowledge the forced occupation of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania in 1940. Partly in response to a 1994 referendum, and at the initiative 
of Landsbergis, the Lithuanian Seimas passed a resolution calling for 
compensation by Russia for damage done during decades of Soviet occupation. 
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While Moscow at first did not seem to know how to respond, with some officials 
saying they would ignore the resolution while others decried it, eventually an 
interesting course was chosen: denial. Valery Ostanin, a member of the Russian 
Duma Committee on Security, told an ITAR-TASS correspondent, "There was no 
occupation of Lithuania: the decision to join the Soviet Union in 1940 was taken 
by the republic's government." Moreover, Lithuania should be grateful for the 
years of Soviet ... um, interest... since billions of rubles had been invested during 
the post-war years to ensure its economic development, to build ports and a 
nuclear power station, he added. (ITAR-TASS, 0520 GMT, 22 Jun 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-0622, via World News Connection) 
 
This is one falsehood that is receiving short shrift, at least: The US Senate 
adopted a resolution commending the Baltic states for their role in the 
disintegration of the USSR and for the implementation of political and economic 
reforms. The resolution includes a statement that the Soviet Union occupied the 
Baltic countries in 1940 and forcibly incorporated them into the USSR, a clear 
refutation of Moscow's recent stance that Lithuania voluntarily entered the Soviet 
bloc. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1000 GMT, 16 Jun 00) 
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